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Russia’s Energy Diplomacy in the
Baltic States
by Zachary Hanson
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, or, “The Baltic States,” are unique in
that they are the first and only former Soviet Republics to join institutions
aligned with the West, joining both the European Union (EU) and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. This move was a
reflection of clashing cultural and political values that had been present before their integration into the Soviet Union during the Second World War
as a result of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
Additionally, after years of Soviet repression, the Baltic States developed a
distinctly anti-Russian stance, as Russia was the most dominant country of
the Soviet Union and after its dissolution in 1991 (Dudzińska, 2011). In the
two decades since the Soviet Union fell and the Baltic States gained their
independence, Russia has been asserting both soft and hard power in nearby nations. Additionally, Russia’s energy policy towards their neighbors
has significantly affected their relationship with European Union countries
through their role as the primary supplier of natural gas.
According to Dudzinska (2011), the Baltic States were a unified force
leading up to their independence. They were the first republics to take
advantage of the apparently weakened Soviet state. Starting in 1987, protests spread throughout Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, at which patriotic
songs taken from folklore were sung. These protests came to be a symbolic
head when a massive protest was held in 1989, in which millions of people linked arms connecting the capital cities of Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius.
This event, held on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact, would eventually be known as the Baltic chain. Later, in 1990, Lithuania declared their independence, soon to be followed by Latvia and
Estonia, though it was not recognized until the Soviet Union was officially
dissolved in December 1991. Estonia was the first of the Baltic countries
invited to discussions involving their EU ascension, followed by Latvia
and Lithuania in 1998. Although not traditionally a significant force in
Western European politics, a variety of aspects began to take route that
provided for the ascension of the Baltic countries to the European Union.
According to Made (2002), the factors that allowed for the inclusion of
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the Baltic States to the European Union were increased Nordic interest in
the area, the relatively strong performance of their small economies, and
a policy of the Russian government to not interfere with the Western governments, as they were still heavily dependent on them for aid.
Similar to the way Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia sought to follow their
own path in 1991, Russia was also searching for their national identity after gaining independence. Russia was unable to become a dominant figure
in the international scene for several years because of reforms that did not
immediately create an environment conducive to a market economy. In
the last decade, Russia has transformed from a relatively weak, democratic
country to an authoritarian country characterized by its strength in energy
policy. However, despite the widely held belief that Putin singlehandedly
brought Russia out of its depression, it is far more likely he benefitted from
“being in the right place at the right time” (Aslund, 2008). According to
Aslund (2008), Putin’s reforms came at a time when the Russian economy
was already improving due to earlier reforms in the Yeltsin administration as well as the increase in the price of oil. Russia holds the distinction
of having the world’s largest reserves in natural gas, the second largest
coal reserves, and the seventh largest oil reserves. Since 2009, they have
occasionally overtaken Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer
(Lough, 2011).
According to Lough (2011), Russia benefitted from the overall rise in
the price of oil from $18 per barrel in 1999, when Putin was elected president, to nearly $148 per barrel, just before the global financial crisis. In
the last decade, not only has Russia been able to solve many of its internal
problems, but it has risen again as one of the world’s strongest nations.
Putin has shown himself to be one of the most educated world leaders in
the areas of foreign policy and energy policy and has shown considerable
skill in integrating Russia’s natural resources with his ability to personally
influence other leaders (Lough, 2011).
The inclusion of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to the EU and NATO
significantly reduced Russia’s ability to influence these countries’ domestic policies, which have been a source of concern for Moscow (Grigas,
2012, p. 2). This strategy is determined through national interest, which
is in turn determined by self-sufficiency and security. In other words, it is
not necessarily bad that Russia is trying to influence its neighbors, as it is
only natural for them to seek ways to ensure the stability of their country
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through the creation of networks to serve their business interests, create a
sense of national unity by underlining threats from the near abroad, and
create a way to compete with the leading countries of the world: the United States, France, England, Germany, and Japan (Laurila, 2003, p. 28).
However, their methods for regaining influence in their traditional sphere
should be a cause for alarm for the governments of Estonia, Lithuania,
and Latvia (Grigas, 2012). According to Grigas (2012, p. 2), “Russian influence in the Baltics aims to constrain their independence and undermine
the political, economic, and civilizational choices they have made.” Russia’s tactics to gain influence in the Baltic region are often covert and coercive and seek to combine their hard power, through their role as principal
energy supplier, and soft power, through extensive networks of ethnic
Russians living in the Baltics and Kremlin-loyal public sphere and private
sphere figures. However, despite Russia’s ability to use their foreign policy
to gain influence, it would not be possible without conditions within the
Baltic countries that make them vulnerable to Russian influence. This paper will first discuss the political conditions that allow Russia to influence
Baltic policy: the fragmentation and commercialization of policy, as well as
the large minority of ethnic Russians living there. The paper will then discuss the lack of energy resources in these countries that have made them
energy-dependent on Russia for oil, gas, and nuclear power.
The success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in their transformation
to apparently democratic states with a market economy has been prevented to a full transition by a political system characterized by fragmentation, commercialization of politics, and a large minority of ethnic Russians
(Grigas, 2012). These weaknesses create corruption and open the door to
Russia’s ability to influence their politics, as well as their ability to create
networks of ethnic Russians that can ultimately threaten the home-rule of
the Baltic States. According to Geddes, fragmentation caused by the party
system limits a legislature’s “ability to pursue its own aggrandizement at
the expense of the presidency and contribute to the accretion of presidential powers” (Meleshevich, 2007, p. 146).
Estonia has become associated with the most positive image of a post-Soviet successor state and has led their fellow Baltic States in their transition
to democracy. One way they have built this image has been through their
ability to limit fragmentation. Estonia was the first among the former Soviet republics to reject the Soviet political structure they inherited and have
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the most “consistent and coherent policy” (Meleshevich, 2007, p. 187) in
regards to party structure. One 1994 law raised the minimum membership
for a party from 200 to 1,000 (Meleshevich, 2007). On the other hand,
Latvia and Lithuania have been less successful in preventing fragmented
governments, though Latvia has been considerably less so since the late
2000s (Grigas, 2012). While the Baltic countries may not be significantly
more fragmented than other Western European governments, other factors, including a lack of professionalism, low standards of responsibility
and accountability, and poor institutional framework in both the private
and public spheres, make third parties particularly susceptible to degrees
of Russian influence. Additionally, the fragile nature of new countries
tends to make it easier for Russia to influence these countries. According
to Meleshevich (2007), the Pederson Index, which indicates the degree of
electoral stability in a party system, shows that Estonia currently has the
highest level of party stability among the Baltic countries.
The commercialization of politics, or the increased ability for businesses to penetrate government and to influence its policies, is another source
of concern for the Baltic States. It occurs when businesses lobby governments to create policies that are favorable to Russian interests. It not only
includes Russian businesses that have invested in these countries, but also
local businesses that export and import goods to and from Russia. The
Baltic States are particularly vulnerable to the commercialization of politics
because they are new states with small economies and are highly dependent on Russia for natural resources (Grigas, 2012). One way that Russia
has exploited this weakness is by exporting Russian business culture to
the Baltics and creating networks of ethnic Russians by encouraging them
to become active in the public and private spheres. Russia has employed
a number of soft power tactics to capitalize on Baltic governments’ susceptibility to be influenced by commercial means. Ways that Russia has
done this include lobbying from pro-Russian businesses and encouraging
a non-transparent political structure.
Finally, a third political factor that limits the Baltic States’ ability to advance is their large minority of ethnic Russians, especially in Estonia and
Latvia, where they make up more than 30% of the population. At first,
this was not a large problem because few were involved in the political
process. Of the ethnic Russians living in Estonia and Latvia, only 15%
had been granted citizenship. However, near the close of the last decade,
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especially in Latvia, ethnic Russians began to make a larger impact in politics. For example, the Harmony Centre, a political party that represented
the Russian minority came in first place in the number of votes collected.
Estonia’s Centre party has also gained significant in-roads in the political
spectrum, as it is currently the largest party representing Russian minority interests (Grigas, 2012). This is a striking turn of events for the Baltic
governments, as Russian minority participation is increasing, as well as the
efforts of the Russian government from abroad to protect the interests of
ethnic Russians.
In addition to the poor political framework that characterizes the Baltic
governments, Russia lacks energy resources, which limits their ability to
influence politics and business. However, the Baltic States are at least partially to blame for their situation because of failed attempts resulting from
political inadequacies to become more energy independent. Together, all
three countries are 90% dependent on Russia for oil and nearly 100% for
gas (Grigas, 2012). However, Estonia is less dependent on Russia’s oil
because they have been able to develop Baltic Shale as a viable alternative
for energy. In 2006, a report by European Academies (Francu, Harvie,
Laenen, Siirde, Veiderma, Collins, & Steiger, 2007), found that Estonian
shale oil provides 55% of Estonia’s total power consumption. Today, shale
oil is considered Estonia’s most valuable natural resource, perhaps because
it gives it leverage against Russia’s ability to exert hard power (Francu et
al., 2007). Estonia’s membership in the EU may have been detrimental
to their ability to becoming fully energy independent. Under a law imposed by the European Union, Estonia is required to change their current
ash disposal method to a newer, yet more costly environmentally friendly method (Francu et al., 2007). Currently, the Estonian parliament has
been looking into new ways to provide a degree of energy independency,
including new technologies and methods that would enable an effective
manner of oil shale production. Still, Estonia is the exception to the rule,
as Latvia and Lithuania do not have enough energy resources to become
energy independent. As of 2010, Lithuania and Latvia import almost 50%
of the energy that they consume, whereas Estonia imports less than 10%
(Barrientos & Soria, 2011). Lithuania has been involved in mining for oil
since 1958 and currently has 400 wells and 19 oil fields. Though Lithuania is able to extract a small level of oil domestically, albeit at a very small
level, it is mostly dependent on oil imports (Pasukeviciute & Roe, 2005).
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Latvia, however, has decreased their energy imports by nearly 40% since
they gained their independence, though they also are heavily dependent
on outside sources for energy (Barrientos & Soria, 2011). While the Baltic
States may be at least partially independent of Russia for oil through their
ability to import trade through terminals on the Baltic Sea, they are almost
completely dependent on Russia for natural gas (Grigas, 2012). They are
dependent on Russia for gas because they lack the resources to produce it
domestically and are linked only to Russia from pipelines built during the
Soviet Union.
In order for Latvia and Lithuania to become independent of Russian
influence imposed through the latter’s energy policy, they must find a way
to become more integrated into the European market. According to Maigre (2010), the Baltic countries are currently only linked with Russia and
Belarus through the existing infrastructure of oil pipelines and electric and
gas grids inherited from the Soviet Union. They are neither linked to the
Western European electric grid (UTCE), nor the Scandinavian grid (Nordel). The Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) is currently
the most significant effort to bring Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the
European electric grid. The first phase of this plan hopes to connect Estonia and Finland through a second electricity cable, called Estlink 2, which
is supposed to supplement the first electricity cable, Estlink 1, by collectively delivering 1000 MW. Another part of the plan hopes to build a connection between Latvia and Sweden. Finally, the third part of the plan hopes
to connect Lithuania and Poland. The success of these projects has not
been guaranteed; corruption, a lack of political transparency, , and other
economic and technical problems has led to the failure of these projects,
particularly the link between Lithuania and Poland. According to Maigre
(2010), one reason for the lack of progress linking Lithuania and Poland is
the lack of “political will” on either side to move ahead.
In addition to plans of building an integrated power grid, the European
Union also seeks to connect the Baltic States via new gas pipelines that
would help them become independent of the old Soviet-era infrastructure.
However, plans to create gas pipelines also seem to be stalling. A plan
that seeks to build a connection between Estonia, Latvia, and Finland,
called the BalticConnector, has faced considerable difficulties, making the
process move forward very slowly. The biggest reason why this plan has
not yet been implemented is that it is believed that the source of Latvia’s

A U C T U S // VCU’s Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creativity // SOSCI // OCTOBER 2013

6

gas reservoirs being Russian in origin will not contribute to the diversification of the market. Another reason for the slow movement in finalizing
this project is that Gazprom, a private company, in which the Russian
government is the largest shareholder, controls a majority of Finnish and
Estonian gas companies, making the feasibility of the politically reality of
this project very low (Maigre, 2010).
However, despite the political problems that the Baltic countries still
have and Russia’s ability to increase its “political power… and international prestige” (Lough, 2011, p. 2), the biggest reason for Russian influence
in the Baltics has been a shift in foreign policy based on nuclear weapons
to capitalizing on their vast energy reserves. During the Soviet Union, it
would have been unthinkable to use oil and gas reserves to maintain influence throughout the communist world because it would have destroyed
their economy, which was already based off the production of nuclear
weapons. It would have also destroyed the Cold War security structure
that was also based off the threat of nuclear weapons (Lough, 2011). However, following the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has become the inheritor of a majority of the former’s natural resource wealth. Several other
countries that were formerly republics of the Soviet Union also have significant reserves, most notably Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, and Turkmenistan, but they lack the infrastructure and financial capital, that Russia
also inherited from the Soviet Union, to export oil and gas to Western
Europe and North America (Wood, 2012).
In addition to the structural weaknesses and resource deficient nations
of the Baltic region, Russia has also used hard power and soft tactics to
influence their neighbors’ domestic and economic policy. According to
Grigas (2012), there are three ways that Russia has used hard power in
the energy sector as a means of influence: oil sanctions, gas isolation, and
nuclear energy. While Russia uses various different methods to display
their hard power in the energy sector, they use a variety of different subtle
tactics, such as creating networks and diplomacy, to conceal the nature of
the more overt methods (Grigas, 2012).
Russia has used the energy sector as a source for their hard power
through oil sanctions. According to Grigas (2012), Russia cut off oil exports around 40 times to its neighbor, mostly to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and the Baltic
States. The most recent examples of Russia cutting of energy exports to
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the Baltics occurred at Ventspils Nafta (VN), Mažeikiu Nafta (MN), and
all rail transit to Estonia briefly in 2007. The MN incident, which occurred
in 2006 in Lithuania, is a clear indicator of the extent that the Russian State
is willing to go to punish a state not acting in line with its interests. Russian
authorities claimed that the pipeline was experiencing technical difficulties,
although they were reported shortly after the finalization of a sale of the
MN refinery from Yukos, a Russian company, to PKN Orlen, a Polish
company. According to Trenin (2008), Russia’s behavior was punitive as
Lithuania authorized the sale to the Polish company, instead of Russia’s
choice, Lukoil. However, Lithuania has been able to resist the efforts by
Moscow, and have not yet backed down (Grigas, 2012).
A similar incident occurred in Latvia during the privatization of the
Latvian Port Authority Ventspils Nafta in 2003, when the Latvian government resisted investment attempts by Russian companies, including
Transneft and Lukoil. In response, the angered Russian authorities simply
cut of the supply of oil to this plant. Latvian authorities, however, also
refused to back down, and to this day, Russian oil does not come to this
port (Grigas, 2012).
In May 2007 in Estonia, protestors tore down a monument commemorating the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War Two. This event
occurred just days before Russia’s national holiday and greatly angered
the Russian government. In response, they cut off all energy exports to
the country by rail. In contrast to the incidents that occurred in Latvia and
Lithuania, the May 2007 halt in energy exports to Estonia was more of an
attempt to alter public policy, rather than an attempt to protect economic
interests. In addition to cutting off exports to this region, it is believed that
Moscow organized and supported several riots and cyber-attacks against
Estonian websites in the ensuing weeks However, following many months
of negotiations between Estonian and Russian leaders, oil exports were
returned to pre-crisis levels (Grigas, 2012).
In the case of oil, the Russian government built the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), completed in 2001, to bypass the Baltic States to reach Western
Europe. The BPS has given Russia a considerable advantage by allowing
Russia to cut the supply oil to the Baltics without threatening the supply to
Western Europe. However oil sanctions do not threaten the Baltic economies. In contrast to oil sanctions, Russia’s use of gas isolation is much
more effective. While the Estonians are able to use shale oil to act as a
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replacement to traditional oil, and all three countries’ ability to import
oil from other sources, all three countries do not have a viable source of
gas, so they are wholly dependent on the pre-independence gas grids built
during the Soviet Union. Additionally, Russia is not as dependent on the
Baltic States for the transfer of gas as they are for oil. According to Grigas
(2012), there are four reasons why Russia does halt the transfer of gas to
these countries:
1. Many Russian businesses hold a controlling share in the three largest gas companies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Eesti Gaas,
Latvijas Gaze and Lietuvos Dujos)
2. There are many local providers loyal to Moscow, which can be used
to lobby the Baltic governments as a means of soft power.
3. Russia can force the Baltic countries to pay full price.
4. By stopping gas from going to Latvia and Lithuania, Russia is preventing the transfer of gas to its enclave, Kalingrad, located on the
Baltic Sea (Grigas, 2012).
One policy in particular that Russia has sought to influence in the Baltic
countries is their support of the EU’s Third European Energy Package,
which calls for the unbundling of the transfer service and the distribution
system. If implemented, this would protect Baltic interests by increasing
competition in the area. The Russian response has resisted on a stipulation
in the law that allows each country to adopt its own “unbundling package.” For example, Lithuania has adopted a policy that can significantly
reduce Russian influence in the gas sector by requiring that the sale of
transfer systems in the power grid go to someone not associated with the
power company. In response, Russia has threatened Lithuania with higher
gas prices. However, as of May 2012, they have failed to alter the course
the Lithuanian government has chosen.
In contrast, the Latvian and Estonian governments have requested
an exemption that would last until 2014. In the meantime, they decided
to unbundle using the least stringent package. Grigas (2012) speculated
that through networks of ethnic Russians and local companies loyal to
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Moscow, Russian soft power has affected their ability to make a decision
truly reflective of national interests. For example, “insiders in the Latvian government believe Latvijas Gaze together with the largest Latvian
consumer of Russian gas, the national electricity producer Latvenergo,
played a significant role in the government’s energy policy and position on
unbundling” (Grigas, 2012, p. 7). As a reward to creating policies in line
with their expectations, the state-controlled Gazprom gave gas discounts
to Estonia and Latvia in response to their support of the least stringent
unbundling package (Grigas, 2012).
Kalingrad is an enclave of the Russian Federation, separated from Russia by Lithuania and Latvia. This gives Lithuania a small advantage because any cut in the gas supply would mean a cut in supply to Kalingrad.
However, since the early 2000s, Moscow has been planning to build a gas
pipeline from Russia to Germany, called the Nord Stream, which would
completely bypass the Baltic countries. The construction of a second pipeline off of the main one to Kalingrad would allow Russia to cut off gas
exports to Lithuania without consequence.
A third way Russia has achieved a manner of hard power in the Baltic
States is in their superiority of nuclear power. Although there has been an
attempt to build the nuclear industry in Lithuania, the project is unlikely to
be finalized because of the apprehension of German and French investors
to invest in a region that they do not deem profitable. Grigas (2012) believes that the investors may have been dissuaded from bidding by Putin’s
efforts to attract them to invest in a Russian nuclear power plant in Kalingrad. According to Klevas & Antinucci (2004), the issue of nuclear power
is very important, especially to the Baltic States. Klevas and Antinucci
(2004) believe that because nuclear power can be used as a renewable resource, it is much more valuable to European investors. However, because
it is valuable, the investors are more likely to invest with Russian projects
because they have shown more experience than their Baltic counterparts
(Klevas & Antinucci, 2004, p. 351).
In contrast to Russia’s sources of hard power, which include oil sanctions, gas isolation, and superiority in nuclear energy, they have also used
soft power as a means of creating influence. According to the definition of
soft power put forth by Joseph Nye (in Grigas, 2012, p. 8), “[soft power] is
the ability to attract based on a state’s culture, political values and foreign
policy, which must be perceived as legitimate and having moral authority.”

A U C T U S // VCU’s Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creativity // SOSCI // OCTOBER 2013

10

Another definition stipulates that soft power is a way of influencing policy
decisions of a nation based off of their ability to create a “long-term relationship.” In the context of Russia and the Baltic States, Russia has used
soft power in a number of ways, but the most notable is their advocacy for
the minority of ethnic Russians, which has increased the appeal of Russian
culture among non-ethnic Russians. Russia has been quite successful in
this regard, through the creation of Russian advocacy groups located in
all three states. The most notable of these groups are the Harmony Centre, which is a pro-Russian political party, and the House of Moscow, in
Latvia. The purpose of the House of Moscow is to promote Russian culture, not only to ethnic Russians but also to ethnic Latvians. Another way
that Russia seeks to promote Russian culture is by encouraging athletes
in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to come to Russia, where they can earn
much higher wages (Grigas, 2012). Additionally, Russia seeks to increase
awareness of Russian culture by offering scholarships to students in these
countries, though this method is much less successful, as many students
decide to study at home or in other universities in Europe. According to
Grigas (2012), one of the most invasive methods that Russia has implemented in the last decade is by offering ethnic Russians automatic Russian
citizenship. However, despite the efforts of Russian authorities to import
Russian culture to the Baltic countries to create a base of power as means
of increasing influence, they have been less successful than before. In the
last decade fewer students have been selecting Russia as their second language, opting instead to study German, French or English (Grigas, 2012).
Russia has implemented soft power in the Baltics through the importation of Russian business culture to the region. Russia has accomplished
this goal through creating Russian-friendly contacts over the last twenty
years. By tying in the motives of the business and political elites, Russia
has been able to influence the policy decisions at the top (Wood, 2012).
One example that testifies to this result is the case in Estonia, in which the
mayor of Tallinn was charged with accepting 1.5 million Euros to finance
Russian Railways (Grigas, 2012). This incident, along with others that are
undocumented serve to show the extent to which Russian businesses have
been able to influence Baltic policy makers through bribes.
In sum, Russia’s use of soft power often blends together with its hard
power, making it difficult to consider Russia’s soft power “moral.” According to Wood (2012), Russia’s ability to influence its neighbors through soft
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power is also affected through conditions at home that are not prime for
investment. To counter the lack of investment at home, Russia attempts to
implement soft power and hard power that aims at influencing the policy
of their neighbors.
The Russian government uses both soft and hard power to achieve
influence in the Baltic countries. This reflects what many consider Russia’s desire to restore the power it had under the Soviet Union. Russia
has an advantage over their Baltic neighbors stemming from their significant energy resources and their ability to extract them with their greater
financial resources. Another reason that Russia has been able to influence
their neighbors is that the infrastructure of oil pipelines and gas and electric grids, inherited from the Soviet Union, connect the Baltic States only
to Russia. However, conditions within the Baltic States themselves also
enable Russia’s ability to influence Baltic policy. The Baltic countries’ governments are corrupt and slow moving, which prevents the completion of
projects that would help to alleviate themselves from the Russian yoke.
However, underlying structural flaws in the government that have been
created through the fragmentation and commercialization of politics cause
the corruption and ineffectiveness of government. The high levels of Russian minorities in the Baltics allow Russia to exploit their influence and
be used as source of soft power. Finally, Russia is able to influence these
countries to a high degree because they have something the Baltic countries need: energy. Without the huge amount of energy natural resources
Russia owns it would be impossible for Russia to have the degree of influence they have among their neighbors. This would not be possible without
their ability to capitalize on weaknesses and take advantage of Soviet-era
infrastructure. Until the Baltic countries are able to solve their weaknesses
and cooperate to build better linkages with the European Union, it will be
impossible to escape Russian influence.
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